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A recent strand of the empirical corporate nance literature studies why American public
rms are increasing their cash holdings.1 As shown by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006), the
average American public rm has more than doubled its cash to assets ratio over the last
twenty years. A question that remains open is what has changed over time to make cash
more valuable to the corporation.
Another strand of the literature highlights the role of corporate cash policy as insurance
against the risk of giving up valuable investment opportunities. Within this literature, Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990) and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) argue that the severity of
a rms risk of under-investment may strongly depend on what its rivals are doing. R&D
intensive industries are a classic example of such interdependence because rms will race
to innovate rst to maximize the returns from their investment. In a racing environment,
holding cash will be necessary not only to invest timely but also to do it faster than the
competitors, pushing them to hold more cash. Therefore, cash will have an important
strategic role and each rms success in innovation will depend on its own cash and its
rivals.
This paper is about the measurement of the strategic value of cash holdings through
the sensitivity of the rms innovation success to its own cash and that of its competitors
over time. It asks what has happened to this sensitivity through the 80s and the 90s, and
whether or not this sensitivity has changed due to competitive pressure from its direct rivals.
To answer these questions we construct a data set tailored to capture the strategic dimension
of the R&D e¤ort. We use data on the pre-clinical stage of the drug development process,
where pharmaceutical rms race to secure, through a patent, exclusivity in the clinical trials
and the marketing of the drug.
Our observational unit is a patent race. We construct all such races between 1975 and
1999 using all of the US patents in Category 3 (Drugs and Medical) in the NBER Patents
and Citations Data File that can be merged with COMPUSTAT. Pharmaceutical patents
are ideal because they belong to Cohen et al.s (2000) discrete technologycategory. Dis-
crete innovations comprise single patents and rms use them for their original purpose: to
block imitation.2 Further, the patent grant summarizes the outcome of the pre-clinical drug
discovery research, i.e., what rm was rst. It is during this stage that the rms race to be
the innovator, and thus when their research e¤orts are most interdependent.
Each observation associates the outcome of the race to the characteristics of all its com-
petitors. With this empirical design we can estimate the parameters of a selection model of
the winner in the Nash Equilibrium of the race. One source of heterogeneity across rms in
the same race is their cash availability. Hence, we can directly ask whether the probability
that a rm wins an innovation race depends on the rms and on the rms rivals cash
holdings.
One main challenge consists of identifying the competitors in each race. To identify the
incumbents to each race, we exploit the link between each patent and its citations in the
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NBER data base. The incumbents to the race are the rms that own the technology upon
which the next innovation builds. Given that each patent must cite the technology it builds
on, we are able to list all the incumbents for every race. Further, the citations count allows
us to measure the value of the incumbency of each cited rm (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg,
2005).
Identifying the entrants to each race is not as straightforward. Indeed, a large number
of patent winners dont appear in the citations list. To nd the entrants, we implement a
method for scoring all rms that have won at least one patent in a given ve year period
as an entrant. This set is clearly very large. Our scoring method is derived from the same
model that selects the winner, a multinomial logit model. We aggregate winning probabilities
over a given time interval and transform the high-dimensional multinomial logit (which has
as many dimensions as potential entrants) to a linear regression where the dimensionality
becomes the number of cross-sectional units. From this estimation we can rank entrant rms
in terms of the likelihood of winning a given patent in a given year. Building on this ranking
we select a set of rms that contains the winner, conditional that an entrant wins, with a
probability close to one.
Overall, we nd that innovation success is very sensitive to cash holdings. Own cash
increases the probability of winning and rivalscash decreases it. This results is extremely
robust and has been consistently measured over and above the factors that traditionally
predict innovation success. Moreover, it has been identied using exogenous variation in
cash holdings. Indeed, part of our empirical exercise deals with nding good instruments for
cash holdings.
The cash balance is likely to be endogenous because it is chosen to increase the rms
competitiveness in the race. Since we specify the innovation success as a function of the cash
holdings once they are given, we risk having unobservable rm characteristics in the residual
that correlate with cash. Our choice of instruments for cash follows two di¤erent literatures.
Following the cash management literature (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999;
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004), we instrument a rmscash level with lags of cash,
assets, outstanding debt and sales. Following the empirical industrial organization literature
(Berry, 1994), we add measures of the rivalscompetitive strength (average experience, lagged
cash and incumbency of rivals). With these instruments, we compute Instrumental Variables
estimators whenever we use linear estimators and implement Petrin and Trains (2003) two-
stage method whenever we use non-linear estimators. Our set of instruments over-identify
the parameters of our model.
We ask how the sensitivity of innovation to cash has changed over time and what has
driven its evolution. The average overall sensitivity exhibits a U shape: high in the late 70s,
low in the early 80s and increasing in the mid 80s through the 90s. We nd that the increase
in sensitivity has been more pronounced for entrant rms than for the average (where the
average is taken over incumbents and entrants). Moreover, we show that the sensitivity
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for the average rm increases as the incumbency value per incumbent becomes more right-
skewed. Further, our measured sensitivity is neither driven by a time trend nor changes
in external costs of nance common to all players, e.g., benchmark interest rates or credit
spreads.
The role of incumbency is crucial to interpret this evidence. Incumbents and entrants
have di¤erent incentives to innovate: incumbents win to increase or preserve their market
power and entrants win to start sharing the oligopoly rents. The empirical literature on
the strategic e¤ects in patent races suggests that incumbency is advantageous. Blundell,
Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999) have shown that incumbent rmsleadership persists along
sequences of related innovations. Given that incumbency values do have a positive e¤ect on
the winning probability in our data, we conclude that fewer incumbent rms have accumu-
lated more valuable innovations along the technology sequence and that this has made them
more competitive. Therefore, the entrants and even the average incumbent have faced bigger
disadvantages over time. In this sense, the average rm has been e¤ectively more nancially
constrained by smaller winning probabilities, and has relied more on its own cash holdings
to be successful.
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006) have recently shown that US rms hold twice as much
cash than they did in 1980. Their results point to the increase in cash ow volatility and
R&D expenditures as the main cause. In our patent race context, the winning probability is
proportional to the per rm innovation hazard rates. In turn, lower hazard rates imply riskier
cash ows and riskier R&D investments. We observe that the importance of the di¤erences
in cash holdings across pharmaceutical rms has increased. Therefore, our results suggest
that the growing asymmetry between incumbent and entrant rms in the pharmaceutical
industry, which seems to be itself a natural evolution of an industry with strong incumbency
e¤ects, may explain why the riskiness of the average rm has increased and why such rms
appear to be more dependent on their own cash holdings.
Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) show that rms hold more cash when their returns
are more correlated with, and their capital intensities are closer, to the industry average.
Hence they conclude that cash matters more in industries with more investment interdepen-
dence. Here we verify interdependence in the pre-clinical stage of drug development through
the joint determination of all competitorscash holdings and patenting probabilities. Our
contribution to this literature is to show, with direct measures, that the changes in the
strategic position of rms in an industry with interdependent investment signicantly a¤ect
the value of cash holdings. Namely, the tougher the rivals, the more valuable the cash.
The change in the cash sensitivity of innovation due to strategic e¤ects implies that the
rm is not only nancially constrained by its own exogenous characteristics but also by those
of its rivals and of the race itself. Even cash-rich rms may compete with equally rich or richer
ones, be forced to increase their spending to win and depend more, in equilibrium, on their
internally generated resources. This is one important di¤erence with the previous literature
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on investment and nancing constraints (see Kaplan and Zingales, 2000, for a synthesis),
where the typical exercise consists of comparing the average rms cash sensitivity of R&D
expenditures across samples of rms that are constrained and unconstrained according to
only rm-specic characteristics (e.g., the KZ index, size, etc.).
Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) have also studied nancing constraints and the role of
cash in the pharmaceutical industry. They analyze variation in the investment continuation
decisions in the stage that follows the patent grant, i.e., clinical trials. Financing constraints
at this stage are driven less by competitive behavior within the industry and more by internal
agency conicts.
Following the critiques by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Erickson and Whited (2000),
and Alti (2003) recent empirical research has found ingenious ways to identify the severity
of nancing constraints for rm investment. For example, Almeida, Campello and Weis-
bach (2004) use the cash ow sensitivity of cash holdings to side-step measurement errors in
Tobins Q and Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2005) use an optimal investment rule that incor-
porates the interaction between marginal and average Q. Here we show that the comparison
of the sensitivity of innovation to cash across di¤erent estimation periods is meaningful and
informative of the tightness of nancing constraints because the sensitivity is monotone in
the strategic position of the rm.
In the following section we develop our hypothesis in the context of the relevant litera-
ture. Section II describes our data sources and summarizes our sample. Section III explains
in detail the strategy used to estimate our model. We outline our main empirical challenges
and explain how we overcome them. Section IV shows the results of estimating our model
with patents won by entrant rms. We use these estimates to implement the pre-selection
of entrants to each race. Section V shows the results of estimating the model with incum-
bents and entrants in all races. Section VI analyzes the determinants of the estimated cash
sensitivity of innovation. We measure to what extent the cash sensitivity is explained by
the strategic position of the average rm in a race (experience of competitors, incumbency
concentration). Section VII concludes briey.
I Hypothesis development
A Product innovation, patenting and corporate nance
There are recent contributions that study the relationship between innovation and nancing
frictions at the patenting level. Atanassov, Nanda and Seru (2005) study the relationship
between innovation intensity and nancing choice. They nd that the more the rm is pub-
licly nanced, the more patents it receives in a given year. They use this result to argue that
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public nance is cheaper than relationship-based nance for rms pursuing more innovative
projects. This evidence is strongly indicative of the existence of nancing constraints for
innovative investment. They use patent counts across all industries in a non-racing environ-
ment, where innovation success is independent of the characteristics of rival rms.
Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) study the optimality of continuation decisions at di¤erent
phases of clinical trials for new drugs. Small rms face nancing frictions due to agency
costs, as the managers of small biotech rms with few patents will continue the development
of patents that have failed previous trials. They focus on nancing constraints after patents
have been won, where the decisions to continue innovating are also independent of the rivals
actions.
B Why should cash matter?
We are silent as to what imperfection renders rms reliant on their cash holdings. Our
goal is to measure accurately the cash sensitivity of innovation and to identify empirically
its determinants. While there are several sources of imperfections in nancing contracts, we
note that all of them share at least one result: rst-best investment is not feasible and second-
best investment depends on available cash. This is summarized very clearly by Kaplan and
Zingales (1997).3
Several authors have discussed the source of nancing constraints for publicly traded
rms. In Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), rms have limited borrowing capacity
due to liquidation costs. A higher cash availability allows rms to implement an investment
closer to its rst-best level. In Rochet and Villeneuve (2004), publicly traded rms face xed
costs of issuing securities when they need external nance. In Schroth and Szalay (2007),
the equilibrium cost of nance increases with the amount borrowed when the R&D e¤ort of
rms in a patent race is unobservable and unveriable.
One conclusion emerging of the literatures on nancing constraints and on strategic R&D
is that nancing frictions will not only give rise to a positive dependency of the races equi-
librium winning probability on the rms own cash holdings but also a negative dependency
on the rivalscash holdings. Omitting these interactions among rms would lead to a biased
measurement of the sensitivity of innovation to cash holdings. Also, a common result in
the literature is that factors that reduce the revenue side of the lenders individual rational-
ity constraint increase the equilibrium cost of nance. In the context of a race, a smaller
probability of winning will imply a lower expected payo¤ to the rm and therefore a lower
expected repayment to the lender. As a result, the cost of nance will be higher for a given
borrowed amount. The racing rm will therefore face tighter nancing constraints when its
competitors are tougher. As Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1999) have shown, more
incumbency gives rms an advantage over their competitors in the race. As a consequence,
the dependency on cash should decrease with own incumbency and increase with the rivals.
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Bond, Harho¤ and Van Reenen (2003) show that R&D ows do not adjust signicantly
during the research program once the program has been setup. Hence, the outcome of patent
races depends on the initial R&D intensity and not in its time variation during the program.
Therefore, the e¤ects of cash holdings on the outcome of the race, if any, will be captured
by a lagged vector of cash holdings. Further, if di¤erences in cash holdings across players
matter, then rms will also choose strategically how much cash to hold in rst place to
improve their competitiveness. In other words, we have to treat the lagged cash holdings as
endogenous.
C Summary
We conclude that the right approach to study empirically the cash sensitivity of innovation
is to focus on the given cash holdings of all competing rms as the determinants of the
innovation success.
We summarize our discussion with the following working hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (cash matters strategically) The instrumented cash holdings have a pos-
itive e¤ect on innovation success over and above experience and incumbency values.
Moreover, the instrumented cash holdings of the rival rms in the race have a negative
e¤ect on innovation success.
We also conclude that we can test whether or not the cash sensitivity of innovation
measures the tightness of nancing constraints by determining if it is related to the race
characteristics as predicted by the theory. Namely, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2 (determinants of the cash sensitivity) The average e¤ect of a rms cash
holdings on innovation is larger when the rm faces more experienced rivals and tougher
incumbents.
II A rst look at the data
A Pharmaceutical patents
The NBER Patents and Citations Data File records all utility patents granted in the United
States between 1963 and 1999. It links the patents granted after 1975 to all the patents they
cite and to the CUSIP code of their assignees.4 This data set is an ideal starting point to
identify the role of cash holdings in innovation races because each patent summarizes the
outcome of the race, that is, who is the winner. Moreover, the outcome can be linked to the
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characteristics of the rms in the race. The link to the citations le allows us to identify the
rms who own the technology over which a new innovation is built. As we shall see, this is
a way to identify the incumbent rms for every race.
The CUSIP codes allow us to nd the rmsnancial information in COMPUSTAT. We
match the rms in the NBER data to their COMPUSTATs records one, two and three
years before the patent application date. The US Food and Drug Administration estimates
the length of the pre-clinical period to be between one and three years, with a mean of 18
months.5
Because we rely on patents as a measure of innovative success, we must focus on an
industry where patents are crucial to reap the returns to R&D investment and where each
single patent corresponds to one innovation race. This is the case for the drugs industry (see
Levin et al., 1987, Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000, and Hall, 2004).6 We restrict our sample
to patents in the technological category 3, i.e., Drugs and Medical, and the subcategories 31,
33 and 39: Drugs, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous Drugs, respectively. Although we focus
on pharmaceutical patents, we note that our method can be applied in a straight forward
way to the study of any race in any industry provided that a satisfactory measure of success
is available.
The race for the patent is the optimal stage to test for strategic interactions during the
drug discovery process. The exclusivity rights on a new drug are only up for grabs during the
pre-clinical stage. After that, only the patent holder may conduct the clinical trials without
the threat of imitation. Further, new drugs are classied as discrete innovations in the
sense that they (i) comprise single patents and, (ii) the patents are used to block imitation,
not to form patent pools (see Hall, 2004).
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the total number of Category 3 US patents awarded per
year has steadily increased since 1975. In 1999 there were almost 10,000 patents awarded.
The total number of patents awarded between 1975 and 1999 is 91,565.
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
1. Patent citations and market values
We use patent citations to measure the market value of each patent. Hall, Ja¤e and Tra-
jtenberg (2005) have argued that citations reect economic value because if a citing rm is
willing to invest in further developing an innovation, then this innovation must have been
valuable in the rst place. Indeed, they use the NBER Patents and Citations Data File
to show that an additional citation per patent increases the rms market value by 3% on
average. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) identify a patents private value through the
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decision to renew the patent. They also nd that the count of received citations is among
the best predictors of patent value, especially for pharmaceuticals.
Panel B of Figure 1 plots the average market value per patent each year, measured by
the adjusted number of citations the patent receives. Following Hall, et al. (2002) we have
corrected the bias in the raw count of citations per patent due to time di¤erences in the
propensity of applicants and reviewers to cite. The raw counts are therefore divided by the
yearly factors they provide. While the total number of patents has increased, the value per
patent doesnt show a clear trend. However, the market value per patent is the highest in
the late 90s.
2. COMPUSTAT match
We cannot match all the patents to COMPUSTAT because not all winners are publicly
traded rms. In fact, there is a large proportion of patents owned by universities. Table I
summarizes and compares the main characteristics of the patents that can be matched with
the those of the patent universe.
<INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE>
We nd a COMPUSTAT match for the winners of about one third of the total number
of patents. Panel A shows that there is little di¤erence in terms of the mean and median
number of rms cited by patent. Expectably, the patents that remain after the merge with
COMPUSTAT are more valuable and the winners have more patenting experience. This
di¤erence is partially explained by the fact that the COMPUSTAT-merged sample has a
much smaller proportion of patents with no citations.
In Panel B, we repeat this analysis within the 5 year intervals of our 25 year sample.
The di¤erences in patenting experience before and after the merge are pronounced. The
di¤erences between the average number of citations received and the average number of
rms cited by patent are also signicantly di¤erent from zero, but arent large relative to
their average values. However, it is clear that any inference based on the COMPUSTAT-
merged sample is specic to the racing behavior for innovations of publicly traded rms with
signicant patenting experience.
B Who wins patents?
1. Incumbents and entrants
A key determinant of success in the racing environment of innovation is whether or not
the competitor is an incumbent. In an innovation race, the incumbents are those rms with
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property rights over the technology upon which the next innovation builds. Blundell, Gri¢ th
and Van Reenen (1999) nd that British manufacturing rms with more market dominance
innovate more often. Hence, they argue, incumbents have an important advantage over
entrants in the race for the next innovations along the sequence.7 Therefore, to measure the
e¤ects of all competitorscash constraints in a race correctly, we need to identify them over
and above the e¤ects of incumbency.
We also use the citations le to measure incumbency. If patent i cites patent j, then j
represents part of the previously existing technology that j builds on. Moreover, the owner
of j has an incumbency stake in the race for i. An incumbency measure based on citations
is robust because it is actually the legal obligation of the applicant to cite all the prior art
of the innovations he claims. In fact, the patent examiner, who must be a specialist in the
eld, examines these citations and decides which ones to be included nally in the award.
A rm is an entrant to a race if it owns no cited patents, or if the cited patents it owns
are no longer valid, i.e., older than 20 years. Table II summarizes the main characteristics
of incumbent and entrant patent winners in the data.
<INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE>
2. Di¤erences in cash and size
Table II shows the average cash holdings and the total asset value of the winning rms, one
year before the patent application. Winners appearing in the list of citations (incumbents)
generally hold less cash on average and have a smaller average asset value than non-cited win-
ners in the same ve-year period. But the di¤erences are relatively small for both variables
in all periods.
The proportion of cash with respect to total assets is surprisingly steady for both types
of winners over the whole sample period. This proportion ranges from 9.3% to 12.6% for
incumbents and from 7.5% to 12.5% for entrants. Both types of winners hold the least
amount of cash relative to assets between 1980 and 1984.
3. Incumbency
Clearly, incumbents di¤er in terms of their citationsvalue and age. The incentives of the
incumbent to continue innovating depend on the value of the current technology and how long
the incumbent expects to keep proting from it. We measure incumbency with the citation
counts for all cited patents of the same age owned by the same rm. Let I0if ; I1if ; :::; I19if
denote the incumbency values of rm f for patent i for all the ages of citations. Hence, a
rm is an entrant if and only if Iaif = 0 for all a = 0; 1; :::; 19:
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Table II summarizes the total incumbency index per rm per race, which is dened as
Iif =
19X
a=0
Iaif  (20  a) : (1)
According to this denition, the younger and the more cited the patent, the larger its con-
tribution to the total incumbency index of the rm. The average incumbency index of in-
cumbent winners decreases sharply after 1979, but remains fairly constant until it increases
again for the 1995-1999 period.
Table II shows also the proportion of races won by entrants and incumbents in each
period. After the merge with COMPUSTAT, there are fewer patents won by incumbents.
However, the merged data base still captures the same clear trend as the patent universe:
the proportion of races won by incumbent rms increases over time.
4. Di¤erences in experience
We use the number of patents accumulated by the rm in Category 3 one year before any
given patent to measure the rms patenting experience in the same eld. Note that this is
not the same measure as incumbency. The incumbency status of a rm to a race is based
only on the count of citations in the same category that must also be younger than 20 years.
Hence, rms with a lot of experience may be entrants to a given race.
The average number of patents accumulated by entrant winners is much larger than the
incumbents. An entrant winner between 1995 and 1999 has an average stock of 2,185 patents
whereas an average incumbent has only about 300. This comparison illustrates clearly the
di¤erence between experience and incumbency in the patent race context. Both are key
determinants of success for very di¤erent reasons. Superior patenting experience measures
the rms advantage to conduct R&D and le patents in the eld (i.e., Category 3), whereas
incumbency measures the rms advantage to keep on innovating along a given technology
sequence.
C Summary
The merger of the NBER Patents and Citations Data File with COMPUSTAT includes a
third of all US Category 3 patents between 1975 and 1999. It is a sample of relatively
more valuable patents won by larger rms with more experience patenting in the eld with
respect to the patent population. We learn that entrants to each race are not entrants to
the pharmaceutical industry: they are large rms with superior patenting experience in this
patent class.
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We learn too that there are important di¤erences between winning rms that are entrants
or incumbents to any given patent. Entrant winners are slightly larger and hold about the
same proportion of cash as incumbents do. They are also signicantly more experienced than
the incumbent winners. Although they have no advantages from incumbency, entrants win
often. It seems that what they lack in incumbency, they make up in cash and experience.
The fact that incumbent rms win increasingly more often over time suggests that their
advantage has become stronger over time. Indeed, incumbency values also increase over
time.
The conclusions from the previous discussion can only be considered preliminary because
we have only compared the winners of races. We can only get an accurate inference through
the comparison of success rates and the rm characteristics of all the rms in the race. This
discussion has shown clearly that, in order to identify the e¤ect of cash holdings on innovation
we have to account for the other two main determinants of winning a race: experience and
incumbency. To measure the e¤ect of cash on the success probability over and above these
two, we must also take into account the di¤erent value of patents raced for, and how this
value modulates the relationship. We continue by explaining the econometric methodology
to assess these e¤ects and the empirical challenges that arise.
III The econometric strategy
A Nash equilibrium in innovation races
Our starting point is the probability that a rm f wins the race for a given patent i against
all other rms g 2 Fi who also compete for it. Let rm fs date of innovation, Tf ; be random
with a distribution
Pr (Tf  ) = 1  e f  ;
where f is the hazard rate of arriving and patenting the discovery. The winner is the rst
one to arrive at innovation. With independent Poisson processes 8f 2 Fi; the probability
that rm f wins race i is
Pr(rm f wins race i) = Pr (Tf  Tg 8g 2 Fi) = fP
g2Fi g
:
In the Nash equilibrium of the race, rm fs hazard rate can be written as a function of
her given characteristics and the other players hazard rates. The rms choice of a hazard
rate depends on her traditional sources of advantage, i.e., experience and incumbency. The
rms cash holdings will determine the borrowing costs to implement the desired hazard
rate and will therefore condition the choice of  in equilibrium (see Bond, Harho¤ and Van
Reenen, 2003).
12
Let the potentially relevant characteristics of each rm be its cash holdings, Wf ; its
patenting experience, Ef ; the vector of the rms incumbency values specic to that race,
If ; and a vector of other control variables, cf . Therefore, the rmsbest response hazard
rates can be written as the system
f =  (Wf ; Ef ; If ; cf ; f ) 8f 2 Fi;
and a Nash Equilibrium is a vector of hazard rates  that solves the system. Further, this
implies that we can write each rms equilibrium hazard rate and its winning probability as
a function of all other rmscharacteristics, i.e.,
Pr (f wins race i) =
f (W;E; I; c)P
g2Fi g (W;E; I; c)
8f 2 Fi: (2)
Note thatW;E; I and c are vector notation for the characteristics of all rms.
This representation is general enough to any form of competition within the racing frame-
work. Firms could either choose directly their hazard rates of innovation or indirectly the
level of R&D that maps concavely into the hazard rate. The crucial point here is that
the Nash equilibrium winning probabilities can always be written as a function of all the
competitors given characteristics.
Note that we use a general setup based on Dasgupta and Stiglitz, (1980) and Reinganum,
(1983) but the derivation of (2) doesnt depend on several of the commonly used assumptions
in that literature. First, we dont need to assume that the winner of the race takes it all
but only that winning is the best outcome for any player. Second, we dont need to make
assumptions about the intended use of the patent raced for. The intended use, e.g., to enforce
it, license it, keep it for its option value, is irrelevant provided that we have a good cardinal
measure of the rms private value, which we do. The essential feature of this setup is that
there is uncertainty in the outcome, and the robust result is that the winning probabilities
can be written as a ratio of the a rms hazard rate to the sum of all the competitorsdue
to the Poisson assumption. We now discuss an econometric specication that captures this
result and tests directly for its comparative statics.
B A multinomial logit approach
We use a multinomial logit (MNL) specication to characterize the selection of a winner for
every patent in our data set. This specication allows us to identify the comparative statics
of equation (2) : Under the MNL specication, rm f is selected as the winner of patent i
from among the set of rms Fi if
W lnWf + EEf + 
0
IIf + 
0cf + f + "if  max
g2Fi
WWg + EEg + 
0
IIg + 
0cg + g + "ig;
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where "if represents the randomness in the race outcome, which is unobserved by all the
rms at the start of the race and is assumed to be distributed independently across rms
with an extreme value distribution. This assumption implies that
Pr(rm f wins race i) =
exp(W lnWf + EEf + 
0
IIf + 
0cf + f )P
g2Fi exp(W lnWg + EEg + 
0
IIg + 
0cg + g)
: (3)
The parameters to estimate are W ; E and the vectors I and ; while f represents the
characteristics of f that are unobserved by the econometrician but known by all the rms.
The MNL specication is ideal for two reasons. First, the MNL is a very good approach
to test the comparative statics of the equilibrium of the patent race precisely because it maps
the given characteristics of the game directly into the winning probabilities. As in equation
(2) ; the MNL allows us to eliminate the equilibrium hazard rates and focus on the observable
outcome, that is, who is the winner.
Second, the MNL is ideal for the racing setup because the winning probabilities are
derived from the comparison of every competitorsvector of characteristics. A rejection of
the null hypothesis that W = 0 implies that winning the race is determined jointly by
all the competitors cash holdings. In particular, our hypothesis that @ Pr(f wins)
@Wf
> 0 and
@ Pr(f wins)
@Wg 6=f
< 0 is true if and only if W > 0:
A positive estimate of W would imply that rms are e¤ectively cash constrained and
the innovation investment is suboptimal with respect to the race equilibrium investment.
Moreover, larger values of W imply a larger sensitivity of the probability of winning with
respect to di¤erences in cash holdings across rms in the race. We can then test whether
or not the changes in sensitivity are explained by changes in the rms strategic position.
Higher sensitivities will be consistent with tighter nancing constraints whenever they occur
jointly with a worsening of the rms strategic position. In such a case, the lower expected
payo¤s would make rms e¤ectively more constrained and cash di¤erences across players
would matter more. 8
C Estimation challenges
1. Specication
The base linear index for all our estimated specications is
W lnWf + EEf + 
0
IIf + 
0cf ; (4)
where lnWf is the logarithm of the value of cash holdings by rm f one year before the
patent application, and Ef is the total number of patents accumulated by f also until one
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year before the patent application.9 In If we include the total, time-adjusted, number of
citations received by patents owned by f and cited by patent i for seven di¤erent vintages,
i.e., I0if ; I2if ; :::; I4if and
P9
a=5 Iaif and
P19
a=10 Iaif :
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To assess the e¤ects of the value of the patent raced for in the equilibrium outcome, we
split the sample into four sub-samples with the patents of each value quartile. We estimate
the parameters of (4) in each quartile. The theoretical e¤ect of the value of the patent on
the equilibrium probabilities of winning is ambiguous. On one hand, a higher patent value
implies a higher payo¤ to any rm in case it wins, which implies a looser ex-ante nancing
constraint. On the other hand, this change shifts all the players best response hazard rates
in the same direction (see Schroth and Szalay, 2007): The sample split allows us to address
empirically the net e¤ects of patent value on nancing constraints by comparing the estimates
of W across value quartiles. Note that the MNL specication cannot identify the e¤ects of
any variable that doesnt vary across rms in the race, so the parametric inclusion of the
patent value into (4) is not a valid approach.
Since we have a 25-year sample, we also expect the parameters in (4) to change over time.
For the same reasons as with patent value, we study time as a modulator of the relationship
between cash holdings and innovation success, and the best way to study this relationship is
to use ve ve-year samples and to compare the model estimates across time. In short, we
estimate every given specication for every value quartile and ve-year period combination.
2. Endogenous cash holdings
The cash sensitivity is measured here through W , which is identied through the variation
in success frequencies and di¤erences in cash holdings across rms. Knowing that the level
of cash they hold relative to their competitors before the race are a crucial determinant of
the success probability, rms will choose how much cash to hold before the race starts as a
function of the other playersand their own characteristics. Since it is likely that there are
several unobservable characteristics of the rm that drive this choice, it is likely that lnWf
and f are correlated.
To estimate W consistently, we use a set of instruments for lnWf that are at the same
decision stage as the unobservables in f . Hence, we minimize the risk of any residual
correlation between f and the projection of lnWf on its instruments. The instruments we
use are:
1. the logarithm of cash, two and three years before the patent application;
2. the logarithms of total assets, two and three years before the patent application;
3. the logarithms of sales, two and three years before the patent application;
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4. the logarithms of total debt outstanding, two and three years before the patent appli-
cation;
5. the averages of each of the previous variables for all the other rival rms in the same
race;
6. the average patenting experience for all other rival rms in the same race;
7. the average incumbency value per rm per vintage for all other rival rms in the same
race.
Our choice of instruments is based in the previous literature of the demand for cash
holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Almeida, et al. 2004) plus determinants related to the com-
petition a rm expects to face in the race. The lags of cash and total assets are used to
capture di¤erences in the levels of cash and the lags of sales and debt are used to capture
di¤erences in the changes in cash holdings. The rivalsaverages of these variables, experi-
ence and incumbency are used to measure the expected toughness of competitors. Indeed,
if cash is chosen to minimize the need of external nance and its costs, then this choice will
depend in the expected winning probability, which in turn is a function of the rivalsaverage
characteristics.
We use the same set of instruments for each estimation. Our choice of instruments will
be subject to a test of over-identifying restrictions.
3. Dening the set of rms in each race
It is crucial to determine the set of rms racing for each patent, i.e., Fi: As we discussed
earlier, the incumbents are found in the citations of each patent and their incumbency values
are given by the citations received by their cited patents. However, we dont have a list of
entrants, except for the winner for entrant-won races.
In principle, any rm in the same industrial classication (e.g., 2 digit SIC code) as the
rms who win patents in Category 3 is a potential entrant. However, it is clear that too
many rms have severe disadvantages with respect to the likely winners and e¤ectively dont
participate in the race. Hence, our goal is to dene for every patent a subset of the top
ranked non-cited rms in the industry in terms of their likelihood of winning a given race at
a given time. We continue by explaining how we rank and choose the entrant selection size
for each race.
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IV Evidence from patents won by non-cited rms
The goal of this section is to select systematically those rms that are most likely to be
racing for any given patent among the set of all rms that are not cited but have won at
least one patent in Category 3 in a given ve-year period. Hence, we need to implement rst
a ranking criterion and then to decide on the size of the selection. As we shall see below, the
scoring step follows from the assumed data generating process, i.e., from (3) : Therefore, we
can already use the estimates computed in this step to make inference about our hypotheses.
A Entrant scoring
Clearly, the set to select the top ranked rms from is large. Estimating a MNL selec-
tion model for the whole set is infeasible. To solve this problem, we follow Berrys (1994)
approach: to transform the non-linear representation of the average equilibrium winning
probabilities in (3) into a linear relationship of the observed winning percentages, which is
estimable using linear methods.11
The method is as follows. Since (3) computes the probability of selection of a given rm
to a race, it can also be used in the aggregate to measure the share of patents won by a
given rm over a period of time. Let F Ii and FEi be the sets of incumbents and entrants,
respectively and Fi  F Ii [FEi : Let sjt be the share of patents that rm f wins as an entrant
in year t, i.e., the probability that j wins an averagepatent in t. Let s0t be the probability
that the typical patent in t is won by any of the incumbents. From (3) we take logarithms
on sjt for any rm f 2 FEi and s0t to obtain
ln sft   ln s0t = W lnWft 1 + EEft 1 + 0IIft 1 +  0cjt + ft
  ln
X
g2Fi
exp(W lnWgt 1 + EEgt 1 + 
0
IIft 1 + 
0cgt + gt)
  ln
X
g2FIi
exp(W lnWgt 1 + EEgt 1 + 
0
IIgt 1 + 
0cgt + gt)
+ ln
X
g2Fi
exp(W lnWgt 1 + EEgt 1 + 
0
IIft 1 + 
0cgt + gt)
Note that 0IIf = 0 for all f 2 FEi : Note too that the sum of the incumbents indices, i.e.,P
g2FIi exp(:) is constant across f and varies only across time. Hence, this term can be simply
written as a constant plus yearly dummies, simplifying the model to
ln sft   ln s0t = 0 + 01d+ W lnWft 1 + EEft 1 +  0cft + ft; (5)
where d is a vector of the four yearly dummy variables in each ve-year estimation sample.
This transformation is very intuitive. It says that the di¤erences across entrant rmsshare
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of patents won in a year relative to the share of patents won by incumbents is explained by
the di¤erences across the entrant rmscharacteristics in the same period. Hence, if we treat
the unobservable ft as the structural error, we can estimate the parameters, 0;1; W ; E
and  from the regression of ln sft  ln s0t on lnWft 1; Eft 1 and cft for all potential entrant
rms in t.
This procedure has several advantages. One big advantage is that this method transforms
the dimensionality of the selection problem into the number of cross-sectional units in the
panel. Hence, we can use a very large number of potential entrants every period. In fact,
we use all rms who win at least a patent in a xed ve-year period. Another advantage
is that we can use a straightforward instrumental variables estimator because the model is
estimable by linear methods.
The biggest advantage is that the dependent variable is by itself the score we need in
order to rank rms in terms of the likelihood of participating in each race. Indeed, the
predicted ln sft   ln s0t ranks all rms active in t according to the probability that they
might win against a given set of incumbents.
B Results
1. Cash holdings and patenting experience
We estimate (5) by stacking the ve yearly winning shares cross-sections of all entrants in
each ve-year estimation period and patent quartiles.12 We use an instrumental variables
estimator in all cases, and the set of instruments described above. All estimations also
include dummy variables for each year, and cf includes 2-digit SIC code xed e¤ects. The
results are shown in Table III.
<INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE>
Panel A of Table III shows positive estimates of W for the patents in the upper half of the
value distribution. In both cases, we can reject with more than 99% condence that W = 0:
This result supports our hypothesis that the winning probability for an average patent in the
period-value cluster depends positively on the rms own cash holdings and negatively on the
competitors. The lack of sensitivity in the lower half of the value distribution may be due
to the fact that there are many patents of little value, for which little cash is required in the
rst place. Patenting experience matters little in explaining patenting success in this period,
most likely because patent experience di¤erences across rms in this period are small. Our
specication test statistic is distributed 2 under the null hypothesis that the instruments
used over-identify the models parameters. The value obtained in all cases is well in the
acceptance region.
18
In Panel B we see that the estimates of W are positive and signicantly di¤erent from
zero in all but the rst quartile of the patent value sampling distribution. Note that the esti-
mate decreases as we go from the second to the fourth quartile. The most likely explanation
for this result is that, as patent value increases, nancing constraints are looser because the
payo¤ in the good states is higher.
Experience now has an estimated positive e¤ect on the probability of winning in the top
three quartiles, as di¤erences in experience across rms get more pronounced. As before,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used over-identify the models
parameters.
Throughout Panels C, D and E we see positive estimates of W : In almost all cases
they are signicantly di¤erent from zero with 99% condence. It is clear from these results
that the di¤erences in cash holdings across entrant rms are an important predictor of the
di¤erences in success probabilities over and above experience. Given that our instruments for
cash over-identify the models parameters, we attribute this e¤ect to the fact that nancing
constraints bind signicantly. Further, the fact that the estimated coe¢ cients are smaller
in races for more valuable patents is consistent with nancing constraints for entrants being
looser in races with a higher expected payo¤.
2. Cash sensitivity across time
Several comparisons of our estimates across time but within quartiles are in order too.
The intercept coe¢ cient decreases across time clusters. The negative of the intercept is
interpreted as the average index of the incumbents competitiveness to the races for a given
period. We saw earlier that the incumbentswinning frequency had an upward trend, which
is captured here by the downward trend in the estimated intercepts. Finally, the estimates
of W also increase over time, although not as clearly.
To have a more clear picture of the evolution of this sensitivity over time, we interpret
our estimates of W in terms of the changes in the expected number of patents won per year
given changes in cash holdings and experience. These results are reported in Table IV.
C Interpretation of results
Table IV shows that our estimates of W are not only statistically signicant, but also
economically signicant. There we report the expected change in the number of patents by
a given rm in a given year with respect to a change in a one sample standard deviation
increase in the rms cash holdings, ceteris paribus. The values of all other variables are set
to their sample mean. We report below each estimate the average number of patents per rm
per year in the sample to highlight their relative importance. We also report the changes in
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patents per rm per year with respect to one sample standard deviation in increase in the
patenting experience of the rm.
<INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE>
We see in Table IV that cash holdings di¤erences across entrant rms predict signicant
di¤erences in patents won per year. Overall, the estimated expected increase in the average
number of patents per rm per year given an increase in one sample standard deviation
of cash holdings is between 0.24 and 2.4. In the period of highest sensitivity, the average
increase in patents per year with respect to a one sample standard deviation in cash holdings
is of around 50% of the patents won. After the mid 70s, this increase is above 20% for all
quartiles.
These changes are illustrated also in Figure 2. Panel A shows the changes in the number
of patents and Panel B shows the changes corrected for overall patenting activity. In both
cases, the sensitivity has increased. The increase in sensitivity is most pronounced from 1990
to 1999.
<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>
We note that the increase in sensitivity has occurred jointly with the fact that incumbents
have become more competitive over time. The more competitive the incumbents, the smaller
the success probability of an entrant, the lower the expected payo¤ from the race and the
higher the nancing costs given a cash balance. Hence, it appears that nancing constraints
for entrants as a whole have become tighter over time. We analyze this e¤ect formally in
Section VI, using these results and those for the full sample.
The e¤ect of a one sample standard deviation increase in cash holdings is generally more
powerful than a one sample standard deviation increase in patenting experience, in the case
of entrants. The e¤ects here range from 0.17 to 0.81 patents per year. The importance of
cash holdings relative to experience for entrants seems to have increased slowly in the mid
70s and 80s and fast in the 90s.
D Entrantsselection
We use the estimates reported in Table III to predict the score of each rm. The score is
the probability that an entrant rm wins a representative period t patent and it is computed
from ^0 + ^
0
1d + ^W lnWft 1 + ^EEft 1 + ^
0cft for all rms that win at least one patent
as an entrant. This implies a group of between 11 to 45 rms per year and patent value
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quartile. We rank rms according to their score within the year and value quartile. Since
there are 25 years in our sample and four value quartiles, we generate 100 rankings.
Panel A of Table V reports the average cumulative scores, i.e., winning probabilities, for
the top ranked rms. The predicted probability that the winning entrants is within the top
ten rms, given that the winner of the patent is an entrant, is on average 0.76. The winner
is almost surely within the top fteen. Hence, there is little gain to include as entrants to a
race rms ranked below 20 or 15.
<INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE>
In what follows, the set of entrants to any patent will be the top ten entrants in the same
year and value quartile. Using fteen entrants would certainly increase the chances that our
set captures all the sources of interaction between competitors but it would come at a very
high computational cost. The dimensionality of the MNL estimation with incumbents and
entrants is already large. We have estimated the models that follow with fteen entrants in
the last ve year period value quartiles and have observed extremely similar results. They
are available to the reader upon request. We note too that for entrant won races, we use the
actual winner and the top nine in addition to the winner. The actual winner has a top ten
score almost always.
In the next Section we estimate the models parameters using all patents, and the charac-
teristics of both incumbents and entrants as they simultaneously determine the winner. This
will provide further insight into the role of cash holdings in relation to specic characteristics
of each patent raced for, e.g., the incumbency value.
V Evidence from all patents
A Selection description
1. Number of incumbents
Panel B of Table V shows that almost 95% of patents cite fewer than 10 rms. However,
the incumbency values of some of these are insignicant because the citations are too old or
receive no citations themselves. The right column shows the cumulative relative contribution
of each rmsincumbency value to the total incumbency value of patent i: From (1) ; the
total incumbency value is simply the sum of all rms incumbency values, i.e., Ii =
P
f2Fi Iif :
The cumulative incumbency value of the rst four incumbents relative to the patents total
incumbency value is on average 95% and has a median of 100%.
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Our set of competing rms in a race, Fi, contains the four incumbents with the highest
incumbency value and the ten entrants with the highest estimated winning scores in the
estimation cluster. Tables VI and VII summarize the main characteristics of this selection.
<INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE>
2. Cash holdings and total assets
The comparison between entrants and incumbents in our selection for each race is very similar
to the comparison between winning entrants and winning incumbents that we discussed
previously. Entrants have slightly more assets than the average incumbents. Both types of
competitors roughly hold 10% of their assets in cash, except between 1985 and 1989, when
they hold around 12%. Entrants to each race are also much more experienced, and their
experience advantage increases over time.
3. Evolution of incumbency values
Table VII summarizes the incumbency values of the selected incumbents (as we discussed
above, the incumbency values of the remaining cited rms are negligible). Panel A shows
these summaries for the whole patent universe and Panel B does it for the patents remaining
after the COMPUSTAT merge and usable for our next estimation stage.
<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE>
The incumbency value per incumbent rm has a U shape except for the extreme vintages
(less than one and more than ten years old). For the ve vintages in between there is a steady
increase in incumbency value from 1985 until 1999. The incumbency value of the extreme
vintages decrease monotonically. Very old citations are unlikely to have a major e¤ect on
racing behavior. Hence, we expect that the increase in the incumbency values of younger
vintages gives incumbents an important advantage over entrants. The distribution of the
incumbency value per incumbent rm is also more right-skewed in the 90s with respect to
the 80s for the intermediate vintages. As a result, we also expect the incumbency advantages
to be concentrated in some but not all incumbents to a race. In the next section we discuss
the estimation of the model and the measurement of these e¤ects.
B Method
Our goal now is to estimate the parameters of (3) by maximum likelihood using the set of
selected ten entrants and four incumbents to each race. The estimation is not straightforward
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because some rm characteristics may be omitted. If these rm characteristics, represented
by f ; are correlated with some explanatory variable, then the errors in the selection of the
winner of the race are not independent of the linear index and the MNL formula in (3) is no
longer valid.13
We argued previously that lnWf must be correlated with f : To solve this problem, we
follow the control function approach proposed by Petrin and Train (2003). This approach
consists of estimating f consistently with a rst stage regression of lnWf on its instruments.
Since the projection of lnWf on its instruments is uncorrelated with f ; the residual of this
regression is the correlated component. Hence, the model can be estimated in two stages,
where the second stage computes the maximum likelihood estimates of (3) ; including the
rst stage residuals, ^f ; in the linear index. Following also Petrin and Train (2003), we use
a bootstrap estimator for the parameter estimatesstandard errors.
Table VIII shows the estimates of our base specication for all patents awarded between
1995 and 1999. The estimates of the cash sensitivities for whole sample period (1975 to
1999) are shown in Table IX. For parsimony, we omit here the parameter estimates for
all other four time periods. The inference is qualitatively similar to period 1975-1999. The
results are available upon request.
<INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE>
C Base case results
1. Cash holdings
Table VIII shows positive and statistically signicant (with 99% condence) estimates of W
for the patents in all quartiles. Hence, the probability that a rm wins an average patent in
each period-value cluster depends positively on the rms own cash holdings and negatively
on the competitorscash holdings. The estimate of W is also positive and signicant with
at least 95% condence all but the third quartile between 1980 and 1994, and for all but the
rst quartile between 1975 and 1979. Otherwise its zero.
We showed previously that cash holdings di¤erences across entrants were a very power-
ful determinant of the di¤erences in winning probabilities across entrants for entrant won
patents. Here we compare entrants and incumbents and use all patents and the di¤erences
in cash matter too. In the next subsection we will interpret these estimates to study the
time pattern of this sensitivity.
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2. Experience and incumbency
Patenting experience has a positive and signicant e¤ect in all cases, in line with our expec-
tations. The experience e¤ect was small and sometimes insignicant in the estimations that
compared only entrant rms. Now we are selecting the winner from among entrants and
incumbents, where experience di¤erences are more pronounced. The larger estimates pick
up this e¤ect.
The e¤ect of the value of less than one year old patents is almost always zero. These
patents may be too young to pick up any e¤ect, or too young for the incumbent to cannibalize
their value with newer patents building on them. Patents aged between one and ve years
have a strong e¤ect on the probability of success: the more valuable the incumbent rms own
patents, the more likely it is to keep on winning and the more valuable the other incumbents
patents, the less likely it is to do so. This e¤ect is seen very clearly in all estimation sub-
samples. Older patents have still a positive e¤ect, but much smaller and sometimes nil. This
conrms our point that the e¤ect of cash holdings can only be measured accurately once we
account for the other two important determinants of innovation success: incumbency and
experience.
There are two interpretations for the positive coe¢ cient of the incumbency value. The
rst is that the incumbent has more incentives to keep competition soft than the entrant
to make competition tougher in the innovation sequence. The second is that previous inno-
vations may create better technological opportunities to the previous winners (incumbents)
than to the previous losers (entrants). We believe that our estimates are more likely to
capture the rst e¤ect. Indeed, the incumbency value coe¢ cient will capture technological
opportunity only to the extent that it favours one type of player more than the other because
the left hand side of (2) is the probability of winning conditional on the fact that there is a
winner. Hence, the component of technological opportunity common to all players cancels
out. Further, a patent award is by denition a public disclosure of a new technology, so the
advantageous e¤ects of technological opportunity through incumbency should show up in
only very young citations. The evidence shows they show up in citations older than one and
as old as ve years.
3. Other results
The rms size, measured by total assets has a negative e¤ect on the winning probability. Size
is used mainly as a control variable, but the negative sign is hard to interpret. Even though
size is likely to a¤ect the nancing conditions of the rm, e.g., through collateral, it appears
to have no clear e¤ect on the winning probability over cash, experience and incumbency.
Hence, it is possible that size rather a¤ects the sensitivity of the winning probability to cash
by loosening nancing constraints. In our next specication we study the role of size as a
proxy for easier access to external nance, following an approach similar to the sample splits
in Almeida, et al., (2004) or Whited (2006).
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Note too that the rst stage error component is signicant almost everywhere. This
implies that our rst stage control function approach has e¤ectively captured important
correlated unobservable components.
D Interpretation
Table IX shows a signicant sensitivity of the winning probability to cash holdings. We
set the values of all other variables to their sample mean and evaluate the e¤ect of a one
sample standard deviation increase in cash on the probability of winning a given patent. The
increase in the winning probability ranges up to 0.11 (quartile 4, 1975-1979). The e¤ects are
the strongest in the 90s, ranging between 0.04 and 0.08, and the proportion of patents won
per year per rm in those same years ranges between 0.07 and 0.1.
<INSERT TABLE IX ABOUT HERE>
There is no clear trend in the sensitivity to cash holdings, as there was when we compared
entrant patents only. It is clear though that the 90s have seen an apparent average tightening
of nancing constraints, as the sensitivity increases with respect to the 80s and catches up
to the levels of the late 70s. Also, the e¤ects of cash are often stronger than the e¤ects of
experience, although not as often as in the case of entrants only.
E Controlling for access to external nance
1. Specication
We follow here the literature on external nancing constraints and allow for the dependency
of innovation success on cash to change according to measures of the rms access to external
nance. As in that literature, we expect larger rms to be less constrained than smaller
ones: all other things constant, larger rms have more non-liquid assets that can be used
as collateral to improve nancing conditions for a given investment and require less cash of
their own. Similarly to the size sample-split approach, we expect the success probability
should be less sensitive to cash for lager rms. Hence, we specify the linear index in (3) as
W lnWf + WS lnWf  lnSf + EEf + 0IIf ; (6)
where Sf is total asset value. We predict that W > 0; WS < 0 and the total e¤ect of a
change in cash holdings is positive. The results are shown in Table X.
<INSERT TABLE X ABOUT HERE>
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Note too that this e¤ect is di¤erent from the e¤ect where large rms can hold more cash
because they have more assets. That e¤ect is already captured through the instruments in
the rst stage.
2. Results and Interpretation
This specication ts the data slightly better than the previous one. Pseudo-R2 coe¢ cients
have increased slightly. The e¤ect of size has now a clear interpretation, as the negative
estimate of WS in most cases conrms that cash holdings matter less for larger rms.
In Table XI analyzes the total e¤ects of one sample standard deviation changes in cash
holdings and experience. The e¤ects are of almost the same size as those in Table IX, and
also economically signicant when compared to the average number of patents per year per
rm.
<INSERT TABLE XI ABOUT HERE>
Figure 3 shows the time pattern of the changes in winning probabilities with respect
to changes in cash holdings. There is a clear U shaped pattern for all patents in the top
three value quartiles. This pattern coincides with the pattern of incumbency values for all
vintages between 1 and 5 years old. It suggests strongly that the increase in the sensitivity
of innovation success to cash holdings, especially in the 90s, is picking up this e¤ect.
<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>
VI Explaining the changes in the cash sensitivity of
innovation
Our results so far have shown that di¤erences in cash holdings across rms in the same race
for a drug patent are powerful predictors of the di¤erences in winning probabilities across
these rms, over and above experience and incumbency values. In particular, rms with
more cash are more likely to win. We have identied this e¤ect through the comparison of
success rates across races and across rms within races. Therefore, success also depends on
how much more cash the rm has relative to its rivals.
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A Facts about the cash sensitivity of innovation
The sensitivity of the average rms probability of winning patent races in the drugs industry
with respect to cash holdings has increased in the 90s with respect to the early 80s. We
observe this pattern when the sensitivity is measured using either the set of all potential
entrants over entrant won patents only or the set of incumbents and pre-selected entrants
over all patents. In the former case, the sensitivity increases throughout the whole sample
period.
What explains these changes in the cash sensitivity over time? What has changed exoge-
nously over this period to account for such patterns? To answer these question we make three
observations based on our results: (i) incumbents have won an increasing share of patents over
time; (ii) incumbency values have a positive e¤ect on the winning probability; and (iii) the
time pattern of the average sensitivity mirrors the time pattern of the average incumbency
value per incumbent per race; i.e., decreasing until 1985, and increasing thereafter.
From observations (i) and (ii), we learn that the average cash sensitivity for all potential
entrants, over races won by entrants, moves together with the incumbentswinning intensity.
Hence, as entrants face e¤ectively tougher incumbents, the selection of those who have any
chance of winning depends more on their cash holdings.
B Determinants of the sensitivity
Observation (iii) is better illustrated in Table XII, which analyzes the determinants of the
estimated sensitivities of the probability of winning a given patent with respect to cash
holdings. We regress the 20 sensitivity values of each time period and patent value quartile
combination, as reported in Table XI, on the possible determinants.
<INSERT TABLE XII ABOUT HERE>
Our main regressor is the average incumbency value per incumbent rm in the average
race in the estimation cluster. We show the estimates of its e¤ects on the cash sensitivity
in columns (1) through (7). To keep the specication parsimonious, we use the incumbency
value of citations from two vintages: younger and older than ve years of age. As we saw
before, the vintages younger than ve years old have the most signicant e¤ects on the
winning probabilities. All the specications include either a time trend or time dummies.
Columns (1) and (2) report the OLS estimates of the e¤ects of the incumbency value with
and without an intercept. The model without an intercept provides the best t, whereas the
model with intercept is rejected. In column (2), the coe¢ cient on the average incumbency
value per rm is positive (0.0219), and signicant with 90% condence. Columns (3) and
27
(4) report a more e¢ cient, quartile-specic, random e¤ects estimator. Both cases show
that the average cash sensitivity for both incumbents and the selected entrants is positively
associated with the average incumbency value per incumbent. The coe¢ cient is signicant
with 95% or 99% condence. An increase of one sample standard deviation of the average
incumbency value (0.48) is associated with an average increase of the cash sensitivity of
0:48  0:022 = 0:011. This increase is signicant relative to the average sample sensitivity
(0.03), and almost doubles the contemporaneous e¤ect of the time trend.
Table XII shows clearly that the average cash sensitivity for both incumbents and the se-
lected entrants moves together with the average incumbency value per incumbent. Increases
in the average incumbency value per incumbent increase the competitiveness of incumbents
with respect to entrants, and thus with respect to the average rm in the race. Moreover,
the skewness of the incumbency value per incumbent follows a similar pattern too: it de-
creases until the mid 80s, then increases. Therefore, fewer incumbents have become more
competitive with respect to the remaining incumbents and the entrants in any given race.
The average sensitivity is then essentially capturing the incumbency concentration over the
set of rms in the race, and it is higher when the average rm faces a tougher incumbent.
We conclude from this evidence that some incumbent rms have accumulated more valuable
innovations along the technology sequence and this has made them more competitive. As a
result, rms without ownership of the building technologies have faced bigger disadvantages
over time. Facing smaller probabilities of winning, the average rm has become e¤ectively
more nancially constrained and has relied more on their own cash holdings to be successful.
Columns (5) and (6) show that the co-movement is robust to adding further controls
for time-changing costs of nance. We include the ve-year average annual Bank Prime
loan rate and the ve-year average of the Moodys AAA corporate, one year to maturity,
credit spread (the results for BAA ratings are very similar and thus omitted). Both have
no signicant e¤ect on the cash sensitivity. Our sensitivity measure adjusts to changes in
the asymmetry between competing rms, i.e., the incumbency values, and not to changes in
factors that a¤ect all rms symmetrically, e.g., the benchmark cost of nance. Therefore,
we have clearly identied a large increase in the importance of internal resources to nance
innovation in pharmaceuticals since the mid 80s due to changes in the strategic environment
and not in the external nancing environment.
Naturally, the average rm, and especially entrants, have used their patenting experience
to counter the more concentrated incumbency disadvantage, but the e¤ect of experience has
remained steady. It has only partially substituted the advantages of using own cash. In
deed, columns (8) and (9) of Table XII show that the cash sensitivity of winning is not
associated with either the entrantsnor the incumbentsexperience.
Our results point to a natural evolution of an industry where incumbency gives an ad-
vantage. In such a case, the asymmetry between entrants and incumbents will typically
grow. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006) show that the typical U.S. public rm holds twice as
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much more cash in 2004 than it used to do in 1980. They attribute this change mainly to
the increase in cash ow volatility and R&D expenditures. The cash holdings of the rms
racing for drugs have not increased as dramatically, but the importance of the di¤erences
in cash holdings certainly has. Moreover, decreases in the winning probability in the con-
text of patent races map one to one into per rm innovation hazard rates, which in turn
imply riskier cash ows and riskier R&D investments. Hence, increases in the competitive
advantage of incumbents imply increases in the volatility of entrantscash ows and R&D in-
vestment. Therefore, we believe that our results are in line with those of Bates et al. (2006).
Further, this paper provides an explanation to what is behind the increase in riskiness for
pharmaceutical rms that are entrants to given technology lines.
VII Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that the cash holdings of a rm and of its competitorsin an innovation
race matter. These e¤ect are robust, and have been consistently measured over and above
the factors that traditionally predict innovation success. We have attributed the average
increased dependency of innovation success on cash holdings to the increased concentration of
the competitive advantage of technology leaders over laggards in the pharmaceutical industry.
Our inference is limited only to the pharmaceutical industry because we have used only
data on drugs patents. It is not clear whether or not patent data mirror well the strategic
behavior towards innovation in other industries. However, our empirical methodology is
applicable to any industry where rms derive larger benets from innovating rst. Future
applications of it would require accurate data on innovation counts.
The increased dependency of cash seems to be an economy-wide phenomenon. Future
research could apply our methods to industries where innovators have rst-mover advantages
to see if the reason there is also the growing asymmetry between incumbents and entrants.
Future research could also ask what has had a more powerful e¤ect on the importance of cash
for innovation: changes in the industrys strategic environment or changes in the external
nancing conditions.
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Footnotes
1. See Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2006) and Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2007).
2. Firms that develop complex technologies(software, electrical equipment) accumulate
bundles of patents to induce rivals to negotiate property rights over complementary
technologies (Hall, 2004).
3. This consensus synthesizes from the debate between Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988, 2000) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000). The basic intuition of why cash
holdings matter goes back to Keynes (1936, p. 196).
4. See Hall, Ja¤ee and Trajtenberg (2002) for a description of its contents, and Ja¤ee and
Trajtenberg (2002) for an extensive summary of the data, and a discussion of its main
uses and value.
5. US FDAs Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Handbook, available at:
http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/.
6. It is widely acknowledged that rms in many other industries use other mechanisms
to protect the competitive advantages of R&D (e.g., superior marketing, customer
service, client switching costs). In such industries, patent records do not represent well
the innovations and the races for them.
7. The advantage of incumbents over entrants in innovation races is explained by the
e¢ ciency e¤ect: entrants have little incentives to innovate whenever they expect tough
competition from the incumbentscoexisting old technology. The oligopolist rms have
greater incentives to remain a softoligopoly that the entrants to compete in a tough
one.
8. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that optimal investment may well be convex or
concave in the rms cash holdings and therefore the investment sensitivity to cash
ow is not informative of the tightness of nancing constraints. Note that here we
measure the sensitivity of the outcome of the race, i.e., who wins, and not of the input
to the race, i.e., investment.
9. All of the results that follow are identical when using two instead of one-year lags for
cash holdings and rm size. The results are available upon request.
10. We have also estimated all the specications that follow with the twenty yearly vintages.
The e¤ects of patents older than ve years are very small compared to the e¤ects of the
younger ones. Hence, we group all citations older than ve years in the two vintages
proposed above, i.e., the 5 to 10 and the 10 to 20 year-old citations. For parsimony, we
report only the specication that groups the twenty vintages in seven. This grouping
has virtually no e¤ect on the estimates of all other parameters.
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11. Berry (1994) discusses this method for the estimation of the average determinants
of the indirect utility function when agents make discrete consumption choices. The
method is general enough to apply to many other contexts, e.g., ours.
12. An alternative is to compute patent winning shares over ve years and estimate the
model with only one cross-section of participating rms. The yearly aggregation has
the advantage that it captures better the dynamics of entry and exit, as it denes
shares only with rms observed participating in one year. Further, this aggregation
allows for rankings that change yearly and uses also time variation in experience and
cash.
13. The MNL probability that f wins the race is Pr(rm f wins race i) =
R
A"i
dG("0i);
where A"i is the set of "i that lead to the selection of f over all other rms g 2 Fi; i.e.,
A"i = f"ij
W lnWf + EEf + 
0
IIf + 
0cf + f + "if 
maxg2Fi WWg + EEg + 
0
IIg + 
0cg + g + "ig
g:
If the joint distribution G ("i1; "i2; :::; "iFi) is of the extreme value type and all f are
observable, then the MNL probability that rm f is selected is
exp(W lnWf + EEf + 
0
IIf + 
0cf + f )P
g2Fi exp(W lnWg + EEg + 
0
IIg + 
0cg + g)
:
If f is unobservable, then the errors "if + f are correlated with lnWf and the inte-
gration to obtain the MNL formula is not possible.
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Table III: Estimates of the models parameters for patents won by non-cited rms
This table shows the estimates of the parameters of the model that selects a winner to
each patent from the set of all non-cited rms that won at least one patent in the same
ve-year period. The estimates were computed using an instrumental variables estimator,
following Berrys (1994) method. The estimable model is:
ln sft   ln s0t = W lnWft 1 + EEft 1 + 
0
cft + ft;
where sft is the share of patents won by rm f in year t, and s0t is the share of patents
with self-cited winners, i.e., won by an incumbent. The regressors are listed below. The
instruments for cash holdings are the logarithm of sales, cash, assets and outstanding
debt, all in years t  2 and t  3, and the averages of sales, assets, outstanding debt and
accumulated patents by all other rms in the same period. The estimatesstandard errors
are computed using a covariance matrix estimator robust to correlation within the same 2-
digit SIC code. They are shown in brackets under the parameter estimate. The estimation
uses all US patents won by listed rms in COMPUSTAT, between 1975 and 1999, in the
technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patents are
classied into quartiles according to the number of citations they receive. The number of
citations is asjusted to reect time di¤erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors
provided by Hall, et al., (2002). All specications include dummy variables for all but one
of the 2-digit SIC codes observed in the sample and for all but one of the sample years.
Panel A: Estimation Period from 1975 to 1979
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:053 0:044 0:207 0:129
before the patent was awarded (lnWft 1) (0:118) (0:092) (0:057) (0:038)
Total patents accumulated by the rm  0:0004 0:0015 0:0000 0:0007
up to one year before the award (Eft 1) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Constant  4:465  5:093  5:756  5:226
(0:711) (0:458) (0:326) (0:242)
Number of observations 72 131 158 147
R2 0:06 0:23 0:30 0:21
F statistic 2; 869:714 26; 203:956 46; 417:519 17:265
P value of F Statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Test of Over Identifying Restrictions 6:120 9:746 12:171 19:787
P value of 2 statistic 0:865 0:940 0:935 0:535
Panel B: Estimation Period from 1980 to 1984
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:101 0:267 0:159 0:144
before the patent was awarded (lnWft 1) (0:088) (0:074) (0:064) (0:058)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:0003 0:0007 0:0012 0:0007
up to one year before the award (Eft 1) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Constant  3:775  5:776  6:248  6:014
(0:460) (0:347) (0:377) (0:327)
Number of observations 65 110 136 130
R2 0:15 0:31 0:34 0:23
F statistic 319:918 28:156 33:911 105:087
P value of F Statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Test of Over Identifying Restrictions 7:841 9:110 19:128 6:595
P value of 2 statistic 0:727 0:909 0:262 0:980
38
Table III, continued.
Panel C: Estimation Period from 1985 to 1989
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:233 0:145 0:135 0:101
before the patent was awarded (lnWft 1) (0:127) (0:053) (0:056) (0:046)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:0001 0:0006 0:0008 0:0005
up to one year before the award (Eft 1) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:0002)
Constant  5:958  6:389  6:527  5:928
(0:876) (0:306) (0:318) (0:371)
Number of observations 65 138 178 199
R2 0:05 0:46 0:47 0:31
F statistic 10:882 19; 485:801 1; 341:881 8:365
P value of F Statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Test of Over Identifying Restrictions 3:183 26:334 33:785 16:578
P value of 2 statistic 0:988 0:092 0:009 0:829
Panel D: Estimation Period from 1990 to 1994
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:207 0:279 0:218 0:176
before the patent was awarded (lnWft 1) (0:076) (0:052) (0:036) (0:038)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:0001 0:0001 0:0005 0:0004
up to one year before the award (Eft 1) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Constant  6:38  7:247  7:164  6:586
(0:427) (0:332) (0:193) (0:186)
Number of observations 98 131 220 211
R2 0:24 0:39 0:49 0:44
F statistic 723:838 2; 346:024 37:223 88:97
P value of F Statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Test of Over Identifying Restrictions 9:265 1:586 9:310 7:605
P value of 2 statistic 0:902 1:000 0:952 0:990
Panel E: Estimation Period from 1995 to 1999
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:298 0:228 0:209 0:262
before the patent was awarded (lnWft 1) (0:050) (0:044) (0:044) (0:047)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:0004 0:0002 0:0003 0:0003
up to one year before the award (Eft 1) (0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001) (0:0001)
Constant  8:61  7:788  7:177  8:449
(0:394) (0:269) (0:238) (0:353)
Number of observations 180 135 77 146
R2 0:52 0:53 0:50 0:51
F statistic 26:986 91:423 37:758 5; 898:445
P value of F Statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Test of Over Identifying Restrictions 29:743 13:748 6:205 12:666
P value of 2 statistic 0:028 0:617 0:961 0:758
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The F-statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
c The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that the instruments provide enough
exogenous variation to overidentify the models parameters.
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Table VI: Summary statistics of the characteristics of the rms selected to each race
This table summarizes the main characteristics of the rms selected as the most likely
participants in every given patent race. The selection includes the top four cited rms
(incumbents) according to their contribution to the incumbency value of every patent
and the top ten non-cited rms (entrants) according to the predicted probability of
winning every given patent among the set of all non-cited rms with at least one patent
in the same year. The probabilities are predicted using the model and the estimates
reported in Table III. Each selection includes the actual winner, and it is done for
all US patents in the NBER Database, between 1975 and 1999, category 3 (Drugs and
Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39.
Cash holdings, Total assets, Patents
one year before one year before accumulated
patent award patent award by the
($ Millions) ($ Millions) winner
1. From 1975 to 1979
Selected Mean 218:303 2; 019:305 35:618
Incumbents Standard Deviation (85:474) (1; 029:481) (44:165)
Observations 5; 878 5; 878 5; 878
Selected Mean 276:385 2; 776:869 129:301
Entrants Standard Deviation (140:380) (2; 317:138) (113:864)
Observations 29; 590 29; 590 29; 590
2. From 1980 to 1984
Selected Mean 350:492 3; 059:526 96:876
Incumbents Standard Deviation (130:734) (2; 102:791) (123:386)
Observations 7; 351 7; 351 7; 351
Selected Mean 419:558 4; 672:930 477:353
Entrants Standard Deviation (232:966) (5; 357:519) (283:267)
Observations 31; 070 31; 070 31; 070
3. From 1985 to 1989
Selected Mean 549:988 4; 405:751 153:849
Incumbents Standard Deviation (356:459) (2; 572:547) (213:735)
Observations 10; 406 10; 406 10; 406
Selected Mean 900:992 7; 444:320 959:211
Entrants Standard Deviation (1; 704:136) (8; 988:671) (682:861)
Observations 39; 630 39; 630 39; 630
4. From 1990 to 1994
Selected Mean 975:789 9; 688:180 219:141
Incumbents Standard Deviation (527:601) (6; 298:604) (318:013)
Observations 13; 977 13; 977 13; 977
Selected Mean 1; 252:073 12; 399:550 1; 201:756
Entrants Standard Deviation (1; 304:270) (11; 031:950) (764:014)
Observations 50; 520 50; 520 50; 520
5. From 1995 to 1999
Selected Mean 1; 323:478 14; 451:770 289:835
Incumbents Standard Deviation (703:680) (5; 122:284) (423:305)
Observations 19; 501 19; 501 19; 501
Selected Mean 1; 832:491 18; 354:430 1; 363:011
Entrants Standard Deviation (1; 232:780) (10; 099:930) (926:430)
Observations 66; 354 66; 354 66; 398
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Table VIII: Estimates of the models parameters for all usable patents
This table shows the estimates of the parameters of the model that selects a winner of each
patent from the set of pre-selected entrants and incumbents. The estimates were computed
using maximum likelihood and Petrin and Trains (2003) method to instrument endogenous
regressors in the multinomial logit setup. The estimable model is:
Pr(rm f wins race i) =
exp(W lnWf+SSf+EEf+
0cif+f )P
g exp(W lnWg+SSg+EEg+
0cig+g)
:
where the regressors are listed below, and f represents the unobserved rm characteristics
that are correlated with cash. The instruments for cash holdings are the logarithms of cash,
sales, total assets and outstanding debt, all lagged two and three years, and the averages of
cash, sales, debt and accumulated patents of all other rival rms in the same race. The
standard errors of the parameter estimates are computed using a bootstrap estimator. They
are shown in brackets underneath the parameter estimate. The estimation uses all US
patents won by COMPUSTAT rms from 1975 to 1999, in the techonological category 3
(Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patents are classied into quartiles
according to the number of citations received. The number of citations is asjusted for time
di¤erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
Estimation Period from 1995 to 1999
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:616 0:688 0:917 0:646
before the patent was awarded (lnWf ) (0:041) (0:062) (0:069) (0:050)
Logarithm of total assets, 1year  1:128  0:933  0:470  0:508
before patent was awarded (lnSf ) (0:064) (0:092) (0:096) (0:099)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:001 0:001 0:000 0:000
up to one year before the award (Ef ) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Citations received by the rms cited
patents, by age (in years):
Age < 1 0:003  0:002  0:003  0:019
(0:006) (0:006) (0:029) (0:015)
1  Age < 2 0:244 0:169 0:676 0:230
(0:022) (0:023) (0:121) (0:020)
2  Age < 3 0:235 0:187 0:483 0:169
(0:021) (0:025) (0:075) (0:019)
3  Age < 4 0:121 0:109 0:267 0:087
(0:021) (0:023) (0:063) (0:019)
4  Age < 5 0:193 0:156 0:114 0:082
(0:025) (0:034) (0:087) (0:021)
5  Age < 10 0:094 0:115 0:006 0:021
(0:009) (0:014) (0:015) (0:005)
10  Age < 20 0:044 0:017 0:074 0:056
(0:003) (0:006) (0:012) (0:004)
First stage error  0:090  0:458  1:745  1:133
component (^g) (0:087) (0:164)
 (0:142) (0:105)
Number of observations 29,789 13,483 8,754 21,823
2 statistic 2; 799:746 1; 429:349 1; 026:918 1; 889:034
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:224 0:236 0:297 0:221
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
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Table X: Estimates of the models parameters for all usable patents
This table shows the estimates of the parameters of the model that selects a winner of each
patent from the set of pre-selected entrants and incumbents. The estimates were computed
using maximum likelihood and Petrin and Trains (2003) method to instrument endogenous
regressors in the multinomial logit setup. The estimable model is:
Pr(rm f wins race i) =
exp(W lnWf+SSf+EEf+
0cif+f )P
g exp(W lnWg+SSg+EEg+
0cig+g)
:
where the regressors are listed below, and f represents the unobserved rm characteristics
that are correlated with cash. The instruments for cash holdings are the logarithms of cash,
sales, total assets and outstanding debt, all lagged two and three years, and the averages of
cash, sales, debt and accumulated patents of all other rival rms in the same race. The
standard errors of the parameter estimates are computed using a bootstrap estimator. They
are shown in brackets underneath the parameter estimate. The estimation uses all US
patents won by COMPUSTAT rms from 1975 to 1999, in the techonological category 3
(Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33 and 39. Patents are classied into quartiles
according to the number of citations received. The number of citations is asjusted for time
di¤erences in the propensity to cite, using the factors provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
Panel A: Estimation Period from 1975 to 1979
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:475  0:035 0:638 3:361
before the patent was awarded (lnWf ) (0:200) (0:099) (0:100) (0:215)
Logarithm of cash holdings times  0:033 0:035  0:013  0:199
total assets (lnWf  lnSf ) (0:021) (0:011) (0:010) (0:022)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:007 0:003 0:001 0:003
up to one year before the award (Ef ) (0:001) (0:001) (0:000) (0:000)
Citations received by the rms cited
patents, by age (in years):
Age < 1  0:042  0:096  0:051  0:009
(0:106) (0:062) (0:039) (0:021)
1  Age < 2 0:733 0:118 0:026 0:048
(0:154) (0:022) (0:011) (0:011)
2  Age < 3 0:104 0:086 0:026 0:005
(0:041) (0:021) (0:012) (0:005)
3  Age < 4 0:035 0:088 0:035 0:008
(0:025) (0:015) (0:009) (0:005)
4  Age < 5 0:042 0:054 0:022 0:035
(0:018) (0:012) (0:007) (0:006)
5  Age < 10 0:038 0:033 0:015 0:023
(0:016) (0:008) (0:005) (0:003)
10  Age < 20  10:316  12:555  12:400  11:636
(467:420) (529:325) (496:626) (684:447)
First stage error  1:018  1:613  1:388 1:486
component (^g) (0:233)
 (0:129) (0:133) (0:349)
Number of observations 2,807 9,515 11,661 10,219
2 statistic 184:285 434:396 370:479 732:633
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:150 0:108 0:077 0:176
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
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Table X, continued.
Panel B: Estimation Period from 1980 to 1984
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:441  0:343  0:818 0:208
before the patent was awarded (lnWf ) (0:224) (0:143) (0:143) (0:131)
Logarithm of cash holdings times 0:044 0:062 0:096 0:011
total assets (lnWf  lnSf ) (0:014) (0:011) (0:014) (0:013)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:001 0:001 0:002 0:002
up to one year before the award (Ef ) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Citations received by the rms cited
patents, by age (in years):
Age < 1  0:250  0:178  0:196  0:062
(0:202) (0:086) (0:125) (0:034)
1  Age < 2 1:375 0:729 0:602 0:398
(0:532) (0:129) (0:067) (0:038)
2  Age < 3 1:637 0:627 0:442 0:238
(0:268) (0:108) (0:058) (0:029)
3  Age < 4 0:261 0:382 0:297 0:151
(0:105) (0:090) (0:045) (0:023)
4  Age < 5 0:921 0:317 0:313 0:204
(0:173) (0:071) (0:046) (0:031)
5  Age < 10 0:014 0:034 0:025 0:001
(0:012) (0:006) (0:004) (0:003)
10  Age < 20 0:024 0:028 0:020 0:017
(0:014) (0:007) (0:004) (0:003)
First stage error  1:246  1:271  2:015  1:527
component (^g) (0:236)
 (0:256) (0:213) (0:192)
Number of observations 3,392 9,136 13,123 11,014
2 statistic 184:898 296:688 881:076 834:065
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:126 0:078 0:165 0:190
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
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Table X, continued.
Panel C: Estimation Period from 1985 to 1989
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:529 0:476  0:086 0:651
before the patent was awarded (lnWf ) (0:167) (0:118) (0:103) (0:074)
Logarithm of cash holdings times 0:014  0:059  0:005  0:040
total assets (lnWf  lnSf ) (0:015) (0:010) (0:010) (0:008)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001
up to one year before the award (Ef ) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Citations received by the rms cited
patents, by age (in years):
Age < 1  0:151  0:183  0:083  0:018
(0:257) (0:042) (0:033) (0:016)
1  Age < 2 2:853 1:209 0:579 0:265
(0:509) (0:144) (0:073) (0:043)
2  Age < 3 1:212 1:087 0:654 0:215
(0:284) (0:108) (0:055) (0:026)
3  Age < 4 0:601 0:548 0:161 0:119
(0:167) (0:094) (0:034) (0:026)
4  Age < 5 0:863 0:473 0:16 0:095
(0:165) (0:089) (0:041) (0:021)
5  Age < 10 0:145 0:228 0:175 0:089
(0:037) (0:022) (0:015) (0:010)
10  Age < 20 0:007 0:028 0:005 0:007
(0:006) (0:005) (0:003) (0:003)
First stage error  0:544 0:305  0:776  0:690
component (^g) (0:134)
 (0:178) (0:112) (0:088)
Number of observations 4,003 12,183 16,526 15,617
2 statistic 345:685 1; 075:617 1; 519:107 1; 561:553
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:203 0:215 0:229 0:254
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
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Table X, continued.
Panel D: Estimation Period from 1990 to 1994
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 1:251 1:212  0:138  0:491
before the patent was awarded (lnWf ) (0:132) (0:123) (0:070) (0:082)
Logarithm of cash holdings times  0:009  0:005 0:023 0:042
total assets (lnWf  lnSf ) (0:010) (0:010) (0:005) (0:007)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:000 0:001 0:001 0:001
up to one year before the award (Ef ) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Citations received by the rms cited
patents, by age (in years):
Age < 1  0:122  0:139  0:03  0:016
(0:113) (0:111) (0:025) (0:011)
1  Age < 2 1:001 1:261 0:429 0:305
(0:170) (0:129) (0:048) (0:032)
2  Age < 3 1:041 0:509 0:456 0:123
(0:137) (0:085) (0:042) (0:022)
3  Age < 4 0:142 0:227 0:136 0:175
(0:044) (0:045) (0:036) (0:020)
4  Age < 5 0:482 0:253 0:075 0:048
(0:091) (0:054) (0:027) (0:016)
5  Age < 10 0:147 0:156 0:143 0:03
(0:032) (0:024) (0:014) (0:009)
10  Age < 20 0:031 0:035 0:009 0:002
(0:007) (0:007) (0:003) (0:003)
First stage error  1:308  1:627  1:268  1:87
component (^g) (0:167)
 (0:144) (0:090) (0:098)
Number of observations 7,539 11,302 22,904 19,982
2 statistic 427:708 794:330 1; 682:844 2; 045:315
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:134 0:169 0:184 0:261
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The chi2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
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Table X, continued.
Panel E: Estimation Period from 1995 to 1999
Quartiles for Numbers of Citations by Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logarithm of cash holdings, 1 year 0:939 0:806 1:380 0:308
before the patent was awarded (lnWf ) (0:096) (0:118) (0:142) (0:126)
Logarithm of cash holdings times  0:066  0:035  0:053 0:029
total assets (lnWf  lnSf ) (0:009) (0:011) (0:013) (0:012)
Total patents accumulated by the rm 0:001 0:001 0:000 0:000
up to one year before the award (Ef ) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000) (0:000)
Citations received by the rms cited
patents, by age (in years):
Age < 1 0:003  0:002  0:003  0:02
(0:006) (0:006) (0:029) (0:015)
1  Age < 2 0:24 0:173 0:674 0:241
(0:022) (0:023) (0:120) (0:019)
2  Age < 3 0:224 0:182 0:48 0:171
(0:020) (0:024) (0:074) (0:018)
3  Age < 4 0:12 0:102 0:265 0:085
(0:020) (0:024) (0:063) (0:019)
4  Age < 5 0:194 0:15 0:11 0:081
(0:024) (0:033) (0:086) (0:021)
5  Age < 10 0:098 0:113 0:006 0:021
(0:009) (0:013) (0:015) (0:005)
10  Age < 20 0:044 0:017 0:072 0:055
(0:003) (0:006) (0:012) (0:004)
First stage error  0:811  1:494  1:872  1:742
component (^g) (0:089)
 (0:147) (0:135) (0:097)
Number of observations 29,789 13,483 8,754 21,823
2 statistic 2493:025 1330:706 1018:776 1868:082
P value of 2 statistic 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:199 0:220 0:295 0:218
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
signicance levels, respectively.
b The 2 statistic is computed under the null hypothesis that all the models parameters are zero.
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Figure 1: This gure plots the total number of patents awarded per year (Panel A)
and the time series of the average number of adjusted citations per patent (Panel B).
It uses all US patents in the NBER Patents and Citations Data File between 1975
and 1999, in the technological category 3 (Drugs and Medical), subcategories 31, 33
and 39. All citation counts are corrected for yearly di¤erences in the propensity to
cite using the adjustment factors provided by Hall, et al., (2002).
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Figure 2: This gure plots the average change in the number of patents per entrant
rm per year with respect to an increase of a one sample standard deviation of the
rms cash holdings. We use the estimates of the model in (5), which are reported
in Table III. This model estimates the selection of a winning entrant among all
rms who have won at least one patent in the same ve year period as an entrant.
The model is estimated for each patent value quartile and each ve-year periods.
Panel A shows the expected change in the number of patents and Panel B shows the
expected change in the number of patents relative to the average number of patents
per rm per year. The thick solid plot uses the estimates for the patents in the rst
quartile of the value distribution;the thin solid plot uses the second quartile; the
dashed plot uses the third and the dotted plot the fourth.
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Figure 3: This gure plots the average change in the probability of winning a given
patent with respect to an increase of a one sample standard deviation of the rms
cash holdings. We use the estimates of the model in 3, which are reported in Table
X. This model estimates the selection of a winning rm among a set of pre-selected
incumbents and entrants. The model is estimated for each value quartile and each
ve-year period. The thick solid plot uses the estimates for the patents in the rst
quartile of the value distribution;the thin solid plot uses the second quartile; the
dashed plot uses the third and the dotted plot the fourth.
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